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Global imbalances: common problem to solve 
for both advanced and emerging market economies
The recent crisis has shown that in order to enhance ﬁ  nancial stability the international community 
should not only remove deﬁ  ciencies in the regulation of ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets, but also ﬁ  nd 
a durable solution to the problem of global imbalances. The initial result of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and economic 
recession was the lessening of global imbalances, including the reduction of the current account deﬁ  cits 
and surpluses in the leading trading nations and moderate growth in the savings rate in advanced 
economies. In the future, however, unless productive measures are taken, the post-crisis global economy 
with unprecedentedly big public debt in many systemically important countries may again face the perils 
of global imbalances such as currency wars, protectionist pressures and ﬁ  nancial instability.
Solutions to this problem are as varied as its causes and call for coordinated actions by both the 
developed and developing countries. In addition to the adjustment of the macroeconomic and exchange 
rate policies, there is a need to proceed with structural reforms aimed at raising the savings rate in the 
advanced economies and stimulating domestically driven growth in the emerging market countries. Taking 
into account the persisting precautionary motives for many developing economies with volatile capital 
account to hold sizeable international reserves, the development of a fair global ﬁ  nancial safety net within 
the reform of the international ﬁ  nancial infrastructure alongside with the strengthening of the national 




NB: Alexey Ulyukaev, First Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia; Vladimir Smenkovskiy, Adviser to the Chairman of the Bank of Russia 
and Elizaveta Danilova, Chief Economist, Market Opérations Department, co-authored this article with Chairman Ignatiev.
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R
estoring global current account balance, 
distorted during the past decade, is a top 
priority for the international community 
focused on ensuring sustainable long-term economic 
growth. Global imbalances have created formidable 
problems for the world economy, as they provoked 
excessive decline in long-term real interest rates and 
surge in high-risk lending on the global scale thus 
becoming one of the most important reasons for the 
world ﬁ  nancial crisis. For several years prior to the 
crisis ample liquidity and low cost of ﬁ  nancing had 
stimulated ineffective allocation of world resources, 
maintained an excessive level of consumption in 
many countries, created asset price bubbles and led 
to growth in foreign and domestic debt.
 
In the years preceding the crisis many economists had 
warned about the threats of the growing imbalances in 
the trade and capital ﬂ  ows among the world’s leading 
economies, especially the exorbitant current account 
deﬁ  cit in the United States and current account 
surplus in China caused by excessive savings in the 
developing countries and excessive consumption in 
the developed nations. Many believed that a crisis 
could break out if global investors suddenly stopped 
buying US debt securities, compensating for the 
growing US current account deﬁ  cit, and this would 
seriously hurt the US economy and affect aggregate 
global demand. However, the trouble came from 
where it was least expected, the US mortgage market, 
while the low-risk dollar-denominated assets not 
only remained attractive, but became a ‘safe haven’ 
for the investors who withdrew their funds from the 
riskier emerging markets.
 
As the crisis evolved, the local problem of one 
market, although the world’s largest one, created by 
the poor quality of subprime mortgage loans and the 
perils inherent in securitisation, provoked a major 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and the ﬁ  nancial markets became 
virtually paralysed. The contagion of the crisis spread 
all over the world because in the pre-crisis years most 
investors failed to adequately assess their risks and 
there were numerous drawbacks in the regulation 
and supervision of the ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
markets.
 
Imbalances in the global economy created conditions 
that encouraged banks and other investors to 
take excessive risks before the crisis and they 
may destabilise the world ﬁ  nancial system in the 
future, too. More stringent regulation and new 
restrictions imposed on the banking sector in the 
leading economies will motivate banks to look for 
new markets and new instruments with higher 
returns. Thus, to prevent new crises or minimise 
their consequences, the world community should 
not only reform regulation, tightening capital and 
liquidity requirements for banks, upgrading the 
ﬁ  nancial infrastructure and tackling the problem 
of the systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
but also address the problem of global imbalances.
1| CAUSES OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Global imbalances are a complex problem, a peculiar 
vicious circle created by both the developed and 
developing countries. On the one hand, imbalances 
are the result of the deﬁ  ciencies in macroeconomic 
policies implemented by the advanced economies in 
the pre-crisis period. For a long time their monetary 
policy was too accommodative; it focused too much 
on consumer price index dynamics and ignored some 
important indicators of potential threats to ﬁ  nancial 
stability, such as asset and commodity prices. Even 
when the Federal Reserve’s target rate began to rise 
in the second half of the 2000s, US long-term interest 
rates remained unchanged. That extremely unusual 
situation largely resulted from the increased global 
imbalances: as trade surpluses grew, the developing 
exporting countries accumulated international 
reserves and invested these funds in US Treasury 
securities. Given the persistence of excess liquidity 
and low cost of resources, banks did not hesitate 
to take high risks and thus contributed to ﬁ  nancial 
instability.
 
In addition, the developed countries’ commitment to 
long-term ﬁ  scal consolidation amid rapid economic 
growth was insufﬁ  cient in the pre-crisis years. Most of 
them in fact continued to pursue a procyclical ﬁ  scal 
policy, which also stimulated excessive consumption. 
They failed to take advantage of growth in tax 
revenues from the booming housing, construction 
and ﬁ  nancial services sectors for reaching budget 
surpluses. Therefore, when tax revenues fell sharply 
during the crisis, the vulnerability of the ﬁ  scal sectors 
of these countries became apparent.
 
On the other hand, imbalances were partly caused by 
the policy pursued by certain developing countries, 
which stimulated exports and economic growth 
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by undervaluing their currencies. That led to 
signiﬁ  cant growth in their gold and foreign exchange 
reserves, although one should admit that there are 
also objective factors behind the trade and current 
account imbalances of different countries. 
 
Furthermore, there was another rationale behind 
the excessive propensity for savings of some of the 
emerging economies that accumulated signiﬁ  cant 
gold and foreign exchange reserves –the desire to 
create a security buffer against possible external 
shocks, which is the aftermath of the regional 
ﬁ  nancial crises of the 1990s. This group of countries 
includes Russia. These countries are characterised 
by high capital and ﬁ  nancial account volatility, 
massive inﬂ  ow of speculative capital (which can 
quickly ﬂ  ee the country as soon as the ﬁ  rst shock 
emerges), heavy dependence on exports and volatile 
markets and relative weakness of the ﬁ  nancial 
system. The accumulation of reserves is the 
objective necessity for these countries as there are 
no adequate and predictable lending arrangements 
in the international ﬁ  nancial institutions providing 
guaranteed access to credit in the required volumes.
 
The empirical models analysing the unprecedented 
growth in reserves over the past decade are based 
on this very rationale in the behaviour of developing 
countries. One of the early suggestions on this issue 
is the Guidotti-Greenspan rule elaborated after the 
crisis of 1997-1998 stating that a country’s reserves 
should cover at least its short-term foreign debt. 
According to the latest models of international 
reserves build-up (O. Jeanne)1, a country deﬁ  nes 
its optimal amount of reserves, comparing potential 
crisis costs (capital ﬂ  ight and decline in output) with 
the opportunity cost of keeping reserves (instead 
of making more proﬁ  table investments). Analysing 
model predictions for Asian countries, the author 
comes to the conclusion that the level of their reserves 
is justiﬁ  ed if the expected crisis loss exceeds 60% of 
gross domestic product (GDP), whereas, according 
to the author’s estimate, the expected loss from the 
contraction of capital inﬂ  ow approximates 10-15% 
of GDP. Nevertheless, many countries especially 
susceptible to the risk of capital outﬂ  ow may face 
considerably bigger loss as a consequence of a major 
crisis. For example, as a result of the  997-1998 crisis 
Korea and Malaysia sustained indirect losses (the 
difference between the actual and potential GDP 
growth rates in the post-crisis years) equalling about 
50% of GDP (IMF estimate).2
 
In case of a crisis, reserves may be channelled to 
repay the foreign debt of the government, banks and 
companies with government interest, secure imports 
and support the domestic currency rate which will 
help minimise the negative consequences of the 
crisis for the economy. The experience of Russia 
conﬁ  rms this well: during the latest crisis we had to 
use a substantial portion of our reserves to maintain 
ﬁ  nancial stability and minimise the shock effect of 
the crisis for the businesses and households. Thanks 
to controlled and gradual devaluation of the rouble, 
public conﬁ  dence in the national currency and 
banking system was preserved. Since August 2008 
the deepest fall of the RUR/USD exchange rate during 
the crisis equalled 48%, while the capital outﬂ  ow 
in the period from 2008 Q3 to 2009 Q1 amounted 
to USD 195 billion. If Russia had not had enough 
reserves, the rouble’s fall would have been more 
dramatic and its consequences for ﬁ  nancial and 
macroeconomic stability would have been more 
disastrous. In other emerging economies capital 
outﬂ  ow during the most severe phase of the crisis 
was considerably lower than in Russia (see Table 1) 
so the reserves accumulated by Russia proved to be 
adequate to the existing risks. 
1  Jeanne (2007): “International reserves in emerging market countries: too much of a good thing?”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
2  Laeven and Valencia (2008): “Systemic banking crises: a new database”, IMF Working Paper, September. 
Table 1
Foreign sector indicators in certain G20 countries during the crisis
Country Maximum currency 
exchange rate fall against US 
dollar since 1st August 2008
 in %
Contraction in 
international reserves over 
corresponding period 
in %
Contraction in international 
reserves 
in billion of US dollars
Capital outﬂ  ow over 
corresponding period 
in billion of US dollars
Russia 48 36 212.8 193.0
Republic of Korea 45 19 46.0 42.6
Brazil 60 -2 -3.2 17.1
India 22 19 57.3 11.4
Source: Bank of Russia calculations based on Bloomberg data.
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When the global economic situation is stable, a vast 
amount of international reserves in the developing 
countries facilitates the reduction of country risk, 
reduces the cost of credit for the private sector, 
making global capital allocation more effective. 
So, the causes and consequences of global imbalances 
resulting from the policies of the emerging market 
countries are complex and controversial. 
 
The United States and some other advanced economies 
are ‘forced’ to accept investments as a result of 
the policies pursued by their trading partners and 
international investors, who actively invest in their 
government bonds and private sector debt securities. 
For example, in the period from 2001 to 2007 foreign 
investments in US Treasury securities increased by 
2.7 times and in US corporate bonds by 3.1 times.3 
However, this ‘forced’ situation proved extremely 
comfortable for these countries in the pre-crisis years: 
while saving very little, they consumed very much, 
borrowing funds from the whole world at minimum 
interest rates and placing a part of these funds in 
the developing countries at much higher rates.
 
One reason for the sustainability of global imbalances 
is the imperfect international monetary system, which 
is largely based on the domination of the US dollar as 
a reserve currency and lacks adequate instruments of 
providing global liquidity. The main reserve currency 
status of the dollar causes the growth of the US double 
deﬁ  cit (ﬁ  scal and current account), making it easy to 
ﬁ  nance, and this hinders the reduction of the US structural 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit. Imbalances increased not only because 
the IMF had no mechanism to ensure all countries 
effective access to borrowings from the IMF facilities, 
but also because there were no tools to force most of the 
member states to implement IMF recommendations 
within bilateral and multilateral surveillance. 
 
Thus, the analysis of the causes of global imbalances 
shows that their growth is a common problem for the 
developed and developing countries, and should be 
solved by all nations together.
2| IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON 
IMBALANCES IN GLOBAL ECONOMY
 
The disastrous ﬁ  nancial crisis has led to the marked 
contraction of lending in the United States and, 
as a result, there has been a fall in consumption. 
US households, having lost access to cheap loans, 
increased savings. As a consequence, the US personal 
savings rate (personal savings as a percentage of 
disposable income) has risen to the highest level since 
the early 1990s (Chart 1). In the ﬁ  rst half of 2010, the 
public propensity for savings remained unchanged at 
about 6%. In 2010, the national savings rate, which 
includes also corporate and government savings, rose 
as well and the IMF expects in the next ﬁ  ve years 
its moderate growth to the pre-crisis level (Table 2).
3  Data on US international investment position. Source: US Department of Commerce.
Chart 1
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Source: US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Research.
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At the same time, there was a signiﬁ  cant contraction 
in the US current account deﬁ  cit and a simultaneous 
reduction in China’s current account surplus (Table 3). 
Thus, initially the crisis somewhat mitigated the 
existing imbalances but this effect seems to be rather 
short-term.
In 2010, the developing countries, especially China, 
have displayed again rapid GDP growth rates, whereas 
the world’s leading economies (the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the eurozone as a whole) have 
registered the slowing of economic growth. According 
to a preliminary estimate as of January 2011, in 2010 
China’s GDP grew by 10.3%, which represents an 
increase of 1.1 percentage points in comparison 
with the same ﬁ  gure of 2009. Beginning from 2012, 
the US current account deﬁ  cit will start to increase 
again, according to the IMF forecast.
 
The problem of global imbalances may deteriorate 
further because during the crisis all the leading 
economies registered significant growth in 
government debt. The exacerbation of the problem of 
global imbalances and the increase in the government 
debt burden may put in question the existence of 
risk-free assets in the economy and this, in turn, may 
destabilise the ﬁ  nancial system, as the assessment of 
almost all ﬁ  nancial assets is based on the existence 
of risk-free assets.
 
The state of the ﬁ  scal sector in Russia is better than 
in other G20 countries and this provides greater 
potential for the use of stimulating measures, in case 
there is a need for them, and contributes to ﬁ  nancial 
stability.
The stimulating monetary policy still pursued by 
the leading industrialised nations will, on the one 
hand, facilitate the devaluation of their currencies, 
making their exports more competitive and reducing 
global imbalances. On the other hand, the injection 
of vast amounts of liquidity will stimulate the ﬂ  ow of 
speculative capital to the emerging markets where 
interest rates are considerably higher, and this will 
further increase the risk of ﬁ  nancial instability, 
asset price bubbles and an abrupt capital outﬂ  ow.
Table 2
National savings rate dynamics and outlook for certain G20 countries
(% of GDP)
Country 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Japan 30 28 27 28 28 27 23 23 23 24 24 24 24
United Kingdom 16 15 14 14 16 15 13 12 13 14 15 15 16
United States 16 18 15 16 14 12 11 12 14 15 16 16 16
France 19 21 20 21 21 20 17 18 18 19 19 19 19
G e r m a n y 2 12 02 32 62 92 8 2 32 52 42 42 32 32 2
Brazil 16 14 19 19 18 17 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 43 37 51 53 52 52 52 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 27 25 34 35 36 34 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Russia 28 36 31 31 31 31 22 26 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: IMF (data and outlook for advanced economies), World Bank, national statistics, Bloomberg.
Table 3
Current account of certain countries: historical dynamics and IMF forecast
(USD billions)
Country 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Japan 111 120 166 170 211 157 142 166 133 135 130 126 122
United Kingdom -14 -39 -60 -83 -73 -44 -24 -50 -49 -45 -36 -32 -32
United States -114 -416 -748 -803 -718 -669 -378 -467 -400 -420 -466 -524 -602
France 7 19 -10 -13 -26 -55 -51 -46 -46 -46 -48 -51 -54
Germany -30 -33 143 188 254 246 163 200 196 182 173 161 145
Brazil -18 -24 14 14 2 -28 -24 -52 -65 -77 -81 -84 -92
China 2 21 161 253 372 436 297 270 325 394 494 621 778
India -6 -5 -10 -9 -8 -25 -36 -44 -50 -54 -53 -53 -53
Russia 7 47 84 94 77 104 50 70 62 47 44 37 33
Source: IMF website, World Economic Outlook Databases, October 2010.
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In these circumstances many countries with a free 
capital movement regime are imposing restrictions 
on foreign capital inﬂ  ows again. The latest ﬁ  nancial 
crisis provided empirical evidence that in some 
cases restrictions on the movement of capital may 
help change the structure of investments (in favour 
of less risky long-term investments) and avoid 
the most damaging consequences of the crisis.4 
As a result, the IMF, which had advocated for decades 
the free movement of capital by countries that had 
already liberalised their capital account, has now 
somewhat softened its stance: speaking in Shanghai 
in October 2010, the IMF Managing Director said that 
restrictive measures could be used in some cases 
when capital inﬂ  ows may have a destabilising effect.
 
It should be noted that the range of possible measures 
aimed at containing capital inﬂ  ow may be quite 
wide and include various administrative and market 
instruments and instruments of prudential regulation, 
which are designed to increase the stability of the 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and affect the inﬂ  ow of foreign 
capital indirectly. For example, in October 2010 
Thailand imposed a 15% tax on income from 
government bonds paid to foreign investors and Brazil 
levied a tax on foreign investment (differentiated tax 
rates were set on the shares of Brazilian companies, 
bonds of Brazilian issuers, etc). As for the measures 
announced by South Korea last June, their principal 
objective was to contain growth in banking sector 
foreign liabilities. These prudential measures 
include a limit on the currency derivatives position, 
a restriction on foreign currency-denominated loans 
extended by banks and higher liquidity requirements 
for the Korean banks’ assets denominated in foreign 
currency.
 
Russia removed all restrictions on the movement 
of capital in 2006 and it has no plans to reinstate 
them. We believe that some regulatory measures 
aimed at maintaining stability of the financial 
sector, containing excessive lending and preventing 
asset price bubbles may be useful under certain 
circumstances. However, by and large, Russia 
remains committed to the principles of the capital 
ﬂ  ow liberalisation and this, in our opinion, is the 
right approach from the viewpoint of the long-term 
improvement of the investment climate.
 
On the whole, Russia managed to protect itself from 
the most destructive consequences of the capital 
outﬂ  ow during the crisis. When export revenues grew 
as a result of the rise in oil prices and the Russian 
economy was infused with an unprecedented amount 
of foreign capital, the Bank of Russia and the Russian 
Government accumulated signiﬁ  cant reserves and 
4 Ostry  et al. (2010): “Capital inﬂ  ows: the role of controls”, IMF Staff Position Note, February 19. 
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Source: Bank of Russia calculations based on IMF data.
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created stabilisation funds, which protected the 
economy from capital losses when private investors 
panicked. No new restrictions were imposed on 
capital inﬂ  ow or capital outﬂ  ow.
 
There is no doubt that reserves and stabilisation funds 
are extremely important weapons in ﬁ  ghting the crisis, 
but they are not enough. Experience has shown that 
even vast reserves may not be sufﬁ  cient to maintain 
stability on the foreign exchange market at the height 
of an acute crisis when these reserves are spent up 
quickly because of the worsening expectations 
and herding behaviour. Therefore, the policy of 
accumulating reserves and funds should be backed up 
by other measures, including macroeconomic ones 
and policy co-ordination with trading partners. 
3| MEASURES TO MITIGATE 
GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND ASSIST 
FINANCIAL STABILITY
 
An exchange rate policy readjustment by some 
emerging economies and G20 countries’ refusal to 
participate in ‘currency wars’ are important steps 
in tackling the problem of global imbalances, but 
these are not enough. It is necessary further to raise 
the savings rate in the industrialised nations on the 
basis of large-scale structural reforms. The projected 
measures to cut budget deﬁ  cits in most of these 
countries, the reforms of the pension, education and 
healthcare systems and the abolition of excessive 
subsidies in some sectors will help these countries 
optimise expenditures in their economies and 
preserve the achieved economic growth rates on the 
basis of the maximum use of their internal resources 
while restricting the growth in foreign debt.
 
On the other hand, it is extremely important for 
the emerging economies to stimulate domestic 
consumption. The impressive national savings 
rate in China (about 52% of GDP in 2009) and its 
rapid growth (from 37% of GDP in 1999) is based 
on its world’s highest savings rates in all sectors 
–government, corporate and household. These 
levels were achieved, in part, owing to tempestuous 
economic growth rates and, in part, they were the 
upshot of some institutional and demographic 
factors (the restructuring of state companies, the 
transition to the pre-funded pension system and the 
signiﬁ  cant expansion of the share of the working-age 
population), whose effect will abate in the future. 
The state sector, whose savings made the biggest 
contribution to the rise in the savings rate in China, is 
expected to increase spending on social programmes.
 
In its consultation reports within the framework of 
Article IV, the IMF notes that in order to reorient its 
economy to growth in domestic consumption, China 
should, in addition to increasing social transfers and 
implementing structural reforms in the corporate 
sector, allow the renminbi’s appreciation, which will 
increase private sector consumption. It is clear that 
China is facing a dilemma: letting the currency get 
too strong seems dangerous because in that case the 
country may lose its competitive advantage, while 
the refusal to strengthen the exchange rate is fraught 
with the risk of overheating the economy.
 
To resolve the problem of global imbalances, the 
international community should also address the 
problem connected with the accumulation of reserves 
by developing countries for the purpose of creating 
a buffer reserve. More rapid rates of growth in these 
countries create objective conditions for the inﬂ  ow 
of foreign capital. But reserves are necessary as a 
safeguard against a possible sharp capital outﬂ  ow. The 
development of a global ﬁ  nancial safety net in the 
future will help reduce countries’ needs in gold and 
foreign exchange reserves. The further improvement 
of IMF instruments, especially the Flexible Credit Line 
and Precautionary Credit Line, will play a major role. 
These mechanisms should be accessible for the 
countries with a sound macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
regulation policy, which nevertheless suffer from 
high ﬁ  nancial account volatility. It is important in 
this case to ensure that the use of these instruments 
does not become a distress signal in regard to 
the countries applying for the IMF credit lines. 
On the contrary, they should serve to bolster investor 
conﬁ  dence and stabilise the situation.
 
To assist financial stability in the emerging 
economies, it is needed to make carry trade and 
other speculative investments less attractive 
and take steps to increase the share of long-term 
investments. Making speculative investments in 
rouble assets less attractive by ensuring a more 
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ﬂ  exible rouble exchange rate is one of the measures 
being carried out in Russia at present. Measures 
to strengthen the ﬁ  nancial system and improve 
regulatory rules will contribute to minimising the 
risk of a double crisis, when the outﬂ  ow of foreign 
capital provokes residents to actively withdraw 
funds from the ﬁ  nancial system. In addition, Russia, 
like other emerging economies, must stimulate the 
development of stable internal sources of growth 
in the real economy.
Obviously, global imbalances cannot be eliminated overnight and the world economy will still face this 
problem for a time. However, we must not allow imbalances to grow to such an extent that international 
relations will be thrown back to the time of currency wars and protectionism. To prevent such a development 
is the joint responsibility of both the countries with a current account deﬁ  cit and countries with a current 
account surplus. Meanwhile, the best long-term solution to the problem of imbalances would be for both 
the developed and developing countries to ensure a more balanced correlation between national savings 
and investments by carrying out the necessary structural reforms. At the same time, it is clear that an 
open global economy, free international ﬁ  nancial markets and a more effective and equitable international 
monetary system should constantly assist the international community in attaining these goals. 
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